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Abstract 
Canada-Renewable Energy presented the WTO Panel and Appellate Body (AB) with a novel issue: at 
the heart of the dispute was a measure adopted by the province of Ontario whereby producers of 
renewable energy would be paid a premium relative to conventional power producers. Some WTO 
Members complained that the measure was a prohibited subsidy because payments were conditional 
upon using Canadian equipment for the production of renewable energy. The AB gave them right only 
in part: it found that a local content requirement had indeed been imposed, but also found that it lacked 
evidence to determine whether a subsidy had been bestowed. The report is, for the reasons explained 
below, incoherent and could hardly serve as precedent for resolution of similar conflicts in the future. 
The facts of the case though, do raise legitimate questions both with respect to the specifics of the 
case, as well as of more general nature regarding the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), and the role of the judge when facing legislative failure. 
In this paper, we provide some responses to these questions in light of the theory and evidence 
regarding industrial policy in the name of environmental protection. 
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I. The Issue* 
In this paper we discuss the Panel and AB reports on Canada-Renewable Energy.
1
 In that case WTO 
Members challenged the consistency of a measure by the Canadian Province of Ontario (to subsidize 
the production of renewable energy) with the rules of the WTO. The WTO adjudicating bodies gave 
right to the complainants, albeit without upholding every claim presented to them.  
The reader of the reports is left with the impression that the WTO adjudicating bodies felt that it 
was necessary to engage in legal acrobatics in order to avoid finding that a scheme aimed at promoting 
a public good – the underlying feed-in tariff for renewable energy – was in fact a subsidy. There are 
many problems with the approach followed: it is hardly reconcilable with the text and the spirit of the 
relevant WTO rules; it might be giving WTO Members the wrong incentives by opening the door wide 
to industrial policy unlimited; it places squarely before us the question whether the WTO courts have 
behaved as agents called to apply a law decided by their principals, or whether they re-invented 
themselves as principals and decided what the law should be.  
And yet, the WTO adjudicating bodies fought a fight worth fighting for, and at the very least 
sensitized us all to the apple in the picture: the rationale for subsidization should matter, and the 
current multilateral framework, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, must be re-
thought in this respect.  
The argument that we advance in this paper is that the WTO SCM Agreement must be redrafted so 
as to account for the rationale of subsidies: markets work well for ice-creams and not so well for clean 
air, as the commonplace saying goes. The SCM Agreement needs to acknowledge as much, especially 
since subsidies are often less distorting than other instruments of policy intervention aiming to bring 
about public goods, such as clean air. It is not for WTO adjudicating bodies to fix the current problem 
area, it is for the WTO Membership to stand up and respond to the call of duty.  
The rest of the paper is divided as follows: in Section 2, we detail the facts of the dispute, the 
claims of the complainants, and the decision by the Panel and the AB, and in Section 3 we express our 
critique of the approach followed; in Section 4, we ask the question how else could the AB have 
addressed the question asked within the four corners of the SCM Agreement, and we conclude that the 
SCM Agreement as currently drafted does not leave much leeway to adopt similar measures (in 
contrast, the original SCM Agreement, e.g. before Art. 8 was rescinded, allowed for some breathing 
space in this respect).  
Alas, the environmental community cannot rely on the AB repeating its acrobatics either because, 
as we will show, there are a series of problems inherent in the ‘methodology’ it adopted to address the 
issue that make it difficult to repeat it.
2
 It is this observation that brings us to the question whether a 
redraft of the SCM Agreement might be necessary. To do that we have a detour in economic theory, 
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 Two separate disputes (Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generating Sector (DS 412); 
Canada-Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program (DS 426), hereinafter jointly referred to as Canada-Renewable 
Energy) gave rise to two Panels, but at the end a joint report was drafted. Salzman and Wu (2014) provide an excellent 
overview of the dispute.  
2
 Significantly, because the AB did not rule that the measure was not a subsidy. Instead the three members of the AB 
Division in charge of this dispute energetically avoided making any determination; they also laid out the conditions they 
would need to have before their eyes in order to determine a benefit, so the real question is what happens next time, when 
those conditions have been met by the complainants? Here we need to ask whether the AB would find the measure not a 
subsidy because of is object or its intent, a key question, and there are hints in in the text that suggest both directions. 
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and we ask in Section 5 whether and if so, how the rationale for subsidization matters to make the 
point that lumping all subsidies together in one basket irrespective of their rationale (as the current 
SCM Agreement does) is wrong. We distil our main conclusions and propose a re-write of the SCM 
Agreement in this respect in Section 6, whereas in Section 7 we recap the key points we have made in 
this paper.  
II. Facts and Decision 
II.A. The Facts 
In Canada-Renewable Energy, complainants challenged measures that had been adopted by the 
Province of Ontario (Canada) aiming at promoting the consumption of renewable energy. Ontario 
Power Authority (OPA) was providing a financial contribution to producers of wind-power and solar 
photovoltaic (PV) energy: it offered a guaranteed rate for electricity over a specified period (20 to 40 
years) at rates set above those accorded to conventional producers of power. Such payments, over 90 
schemes of which exist globally, are commonly known as feed-in tariffs (FITs), and in Ontario they 
aimed at delivery of energy from renewables into the grid both from commercial producers of energy, 
as well as from individual home owners.
3
  
To this effect, the Province of Ontario would enter into contractual arrangements with producers of 
solar and wind energy (FIT, and microFIT contracts) and compensate them by paying them a fixed 
price per unit of production. This is how the Panel report describes the measures:
4
 
‘The FIT Programme 
The FIT Programme has very clearly two fundamental objectives: First, to encourage the participation 
of new generation facilities using renewable sources of energy into Ontario's electricity system in order 
to diversify Ontario's supply-mix and help replace the generation capacity that has been (and will be) 
lost as a result of the closure of Ontario's coal-fired facilities by 2014, and thereby also reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions; and secondly, to stimulate local investment in the production of renewable 
energy generation equipment needed to design and construct qualifying generation facilities using solar 
PV and windpower technologies. These objectives are pursued through the execution of the FIT and 
microFIT Contracts, which involve an exchange of performance obligations on the part of the OPA and 
qualifying Suppliers. There is no inherent grant element to the FIT and microFIT transactions. 
The FIT and microFIT Contracts 
In essence, the FIT and microFIT Contracts envisage an exchange of the following core performance 
obligations between Suppliers and the OPA: 
A Supplier must: 
i. design, construct, own (or lease) and operate a qualifying facility in accordance with all 
relevant IESO Market Rules, laws and regulations; 
ii. comply with the "Minimum Required Domestic Content Level" when designing and 
constructing a solar PV or a microFIT windpower facility; 
iii. deliver the electricity that is produced into the Ontario electricity system in accordance with all 
relevant IESO Market Rules, laws and regulations; 
iv. participate in a defined electricity payment processes to settle Contract Payments that is not 
unlike that used generally in Ontario's electricity system; and 
                                                     
3
 The contribution was tied to the use of local machinery (local content requirement), a point that we discuss below.  
4
 WTO Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector; Canada – 
Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program (Canada – Renewable Energy), WT/DS412/R; WT/DS426/R, adopted 
19 December 2012, paras. 7.216-19. 
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v. assign all Environmental Attributes associated with the Contract Facility to the OPA, pay the 
OPA 50% of all payments received by the Supplier under the "ecoENERGY for Renewable 
Power Program", and effectively transfer to the OPA 80% of total net revenues from the sale 
of Future Contract Related Products. 
In return, the OPA agrees to make the Contract Payments, which are defined in such a way that ensures 
each Supplier will be remunerated via defined settlement processes at the guaranteed FIT Contract Price 
for each kWh of Delivered Electricity for 20 years.’ 
In its report, the AB provided its own understanding of the challenged measure in the following 
terms:
5
 
‘An entity that enters into a FIT or microFIT Contract is required to, inter alia, build, operate, and 
maintain the approved generation facility in accordance with all relevant laws and regulations, and 
deliver the electricity produced into the Ontario electricity system. In return for performing these 
and other contractual obligations, such entity will be remunerated, over the term of the particular 
contract, in accordance with a formula that is based on a standard "Contract Price established by 
the OPA. 
In addition to these obligations, the FIT Programme imposes "Minimum Required Domestic 
Content Levels" that must be satisfied in the development and construction of solar PV electricity 
generation facilities participating in both streams of the FIT Programme and of windpower 
electricity generation facilities taking part in the FIT stream. The Minimum Required Domestic 
Content Levels do not apply to qualifying projects using any of the other renewable energy 
sources covered by the FIT Programme. The applicable Minimum Required Domestic Content 
Levels prescribed under both streams of the FIT Programme are summarized in Table 1 at 
paragraph 1.4 of these Reports.’ (italics in the original) 
There is thus no doubt that a fixed rate was paid conditional on the use of local content machinery 
producing renewable energy. 
II.B. The Legal Complaints 
Complainants (Japan, EU) challenged the consistency of the Canadian measure under the Uruguay 
Round General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
6
 the Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMS Agreement),
7
 as well as the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).
8
 In a nutshell, complainants claimed: (a) 
that the measure was inconsistent with Art. III.4 GATT, and Art. 2.1 TRIMs, because it was a trade-
related investment measure, and the attached requirement to use Canadian equipment to produce 
renewable energy was a local content requirement, and thus, inconsistent with this provision; (b) that 
since a financial contribution by the government was taking place in order to compensate users of 
Canadian equipment, a subsidy was being granted the payment of which was conditional upon 
fulfilling a local content requirement: consequently, the measure as a prohibited subsidy as per Art. 3 
SCM Agreement. 
                                                     
5
 Ibid, paras. 4.20-21. 
6
 World Trade Organization (1999), The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 17. 
7
 Ibid, 143. 
8
 Ibid, 231. 
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II.C. The Decision by the AB 
II.C.1. The Claim under GATT/TRIMs 
The Panel had no trouble reaching the conclusion that the Canadian measures (the FIT and microFIT 
programs) were trade-related investment measures, and that to obtain the advantage of the programs it 
was necessary to comply with a local content requirement. It thus found – in an aspect of the ruling 
that was not appealed – that the measures were inconsistent with Art. III.4 GATT, and Art. 2.1 
TRIMs. Local content requirements of this type are proscribed in the Illustrative List of trade related 
investment measures cited in Art. 2.2 TRIMs.  
So far, so good: Canada however, anticipating this outcome, had argued that the measure was 
government procurement: the Province of Ontario (through the Ontario Power Authority) was 
procuring renewable energy from individuals producing it. Canada thus invoked Art. III.8 GATT as 
grounds justifying violations of national treatment. Recall that, under the terms of this provision, WTO 
Members can deviate from their obligation to afford national treatment to imported goods (e.g. by 
abolishing, inter alia, local content requirements), if their practices qualify as subsidy or as 
government procurement: had the Canadian claim been accepted, its local content requirement would 
have been exonerated; complainants would then have to argue (assuming they were willing to pursue 
the case further) that the Canadian measure was in violation of Canada’s obligations under the 
Uruguay Round Government Procurement Agreement (GPA).
9
 To do this, nevertheless, they would 
need to raise a new request for consultations, e.g. start another dispute anew. 
Canada was arguing that Art. III.8 GATT could serve as exception for violations of the TRIMs 
Agreement as well, and not only for violations of the GATT. This was necessary, since the Panel had 
found that the Canadian measure was in violation of Art. 2.1 TRIMs. The complainants took the 
opposite view.  
The Panel first delineated the scope of the exemption provided by Art. III.8 GATT. To this effect, 
it held that Art. III.8 GATT could indeed serve as grounds to justify deviations from the obligations 
assumed not only under the GATT, but also under the TRIMs Agreement as well. 
‘The Panel reasoned that "any government procurement transactions covered by the terms of 
Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 will be removed from the scope of the obligations set out in 
Article III, including Article III:4" and "where a particular TRIM involves the same kind of 
government procurement transactions described in Article III:8(a), it cannot be found to be 
inconsistent with the obligation in Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement.’
10
 
In §5.33 of its report, the AB provided its explicit support for this understanding of the relationship 
between the GATT and the TRIMs Agreement: 
‘For the reasons stated above, we consider that the Panel correctly rejected the European Union's 
argument that Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 is not applicable to measures that fall within the 
scope of Article 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement and the Illustrative List annexed thereto. Therefore, 
we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.121 of the Panel Reports, that "Paragraph 1(a) of the 
Illustrative List in the Annex to the TRIMs Agreement d[id] not obviate the need for [the Panel] to 
undertake an analysis of whether the challenged measures are outside of the scope of application 
of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 by virtue of the operation of Article III:8(a) of the GATT 
1994."’ 
                                                     
9
 Ibid, 383. 
10
 WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector; Canada 
– Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program (Canada – Renewable Energy), WT/DS412/AB/R; 
WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted 6 May 2013, para 5.10. 
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The AB then moved to provide the substantive test for successfully invoking this provision (Art. III.8 
GATT); it held that the following conditions must be cumulatively met (§5.74):  
‘We consider that Article III:8(a) sets out a derogation from the national treatment obligation 
contained in Article III of the GATT 1994. The provision exempts from the national treatment 
obligation certain measures containing rules for the process by which government purchases 
products. Under Article III:8(a), the entity procuring products for the government is a 
"governmental agency". We have found above that a "governmental agency" is an entity 
performing functions of government and acting for or on behalf of government. Furthermore, we 
have found that the derogation of Article III:8(a) must be understood in relation to the obligations 
stipulated in Article III. This means that the product of foreign origin must be in a competitive 
relationship with the product purchased. Furthermore, Article III:8(a) is limited to products 
purchased for the use of government, consumed by government, or provided by government to 
recipients in the discharge of its public functions. On the contrary, Article III:8(a) does not cover 
purchases made by governmental agencies with a view to reselling the purchased products in an 
arm's-length sale and it does not cover purchases made with a view to using the product previously 
purchased in the production of goods for sale at arm's length.’ 
In particular, the WTO Member invoking it would have to show that: 
(a) The purchased products by a government agency were intended to be directed at the government, 
or be used for government purposes (§5.68);
11
 and 
(b) That the government did not purchase goods with the intent to resell them commercially (§5.69). 
In other words (§5.69): 
‘Purchase that does not fulfill the requirement of being made "for governmental purposes" will not 
be covered by Article III:8(a) regardless of whether it complies with the requirement of being 
made "not with a view to commercial resale". These are cumulative requirements. We therefore 
disagree with the Panel's proposition that where a government purchase of goods is made "with a 
view to commercial resale", it is for that reason also not a purchase "for governmental purposes".’ 
Finally, ‘commercial resale’ should not be equated to ‘for profit resale’. What matters is that a resale is 
done at arm’s length. The AB noted though, that, under assumptions, even transactions aiming at 
cutting losses could be rational business decisions, and thus, at arm’s length. The adjudicator, in the 
AB’s view, when performing this test should be reviewing the transaction both from the buyer’s as 
well as the seller’s perspective (§5.71):12  
‘We see profit-orientation generally as an indication that a resale is at arm's length. Profit-
orientation indicates that the seller is acting in a self-interested manner. Yet, as the Panel noted, 
there are circumstances where a seller enters into a transaction out of his or her own interest 
without making a profit. There are different circumstances in which a seller may offer a product at 
a price that does not allow him or her to make a profit, or sometimes even fully to recoup cost. In 
such circumstances, it may be useful to look at the seller's long-term strategy. This is because loss-
making sales could not be sustained indefinitely and a rational seller would be expected to be 
profit-oriented in the long term, though we accept that strategies can vary widely and thus do not 
see this as applying axiomatically. The transaction must also be assessed from the perspective of 
the buyer. A commercial resale would be one in which the buyer seeks to maximize his or her own 
interest. It is an assessment of the relationship between the seller and the buyer in the transaction 
in question that allows a judgement to be made whether a transaction is made at arm's length.’ 
When applying this test to the specifics of the case, the AB underscored that this provision could be 
justifiably invoked only if the challenged measure concerned two goods that were in competitive 
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 The AB explained in the same paragraph, that a ‘rational relationship between the products and government purposes 
must exist.  
12
 The AB seems to suggest, without saying so explicitly, that selling not at arm’s length would not remove a measure from 
the ambit of the exemption granted through Art. III.8 GATT.  
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relationship with each other (§5.63). In this case however, the government was purchasing electricity, 
whereas the foreign product that was allegedly being treated worse than its domestic counterpart was 
generation equipment; the AB noted that electricity and generation equipment are not in competitive 
relationship with each other (§§5.75ff.). The Panel had made the same point as well, but had added 
that generation equipment was being used in order to produce electricity, and because of the ‘close 
relationship’ of the two, Art. III.8 GATT was applicable (§5.76). The AB disagreed (§5.79):  
‘In the case before us, the product being procured is electricity, whereas the product discriminated 
against for reason of its origin is generation equipment. These two products are not in a 
competitive relationship. None of the participants has suggested otherwise, much less offered 
evidence to substantiate such proposition. Accordingly, the discrimination relating to generation 
equipment contained in the FIT Programme and Contracts is not covered by the derogation of 
Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994. We therefore reverse the Panel's findings.’ 
The violation of Art. 2.1 TRIMs (and Art. III.4 GATT) as a result, stood. 
II.C.2. The Claim under the SCM Agreement 
For a measure to constitute a subsidy, it must, as per Arts. 1 and 2 SCM Agreement, cumulatively 
satisfy three conditions: (a) a financial contribution by the government must (b) confer a benefit (c) to 
a specific recipient.  
Financial contribution: The forms of financial contribution are detailed in Art. 1 SCM Agreement. 
The Panel had found that the Canadian measure was a purchase of goods, one of the forms mentioned 
in the body of Art. 1 SCM Agreement (§§5.110-113 of the AB report): 
‘The Panel's reasoning in reaching this conclusion was based on three key elements. First, it noted 
that the OPA transfers funds to FIT suppliers for "delivered electricity" into Ontario's electricity 
grid. It is by paying a FIT Contract Price for delivered electricity that the Government of Ontario 
seeks to achieve the objective of securing investment in new generation facilities for the purposes 
of diversifying Ontario's supply-mix. Thus, in the Panel's view, there is no grant element inherent 
in the design and operation of the FIT Programme. The Panel highlighted that, while FIT and 
microFIT Contracts facilitate suppliers' search for project financing, it would be wrong to 
characterize the Contract Payments themselves as finance payments for the construction of a 
generation facility. 
Second, the Panel found that the Government of Ontario takes possession over electricity and thus 
"purchases electricity". The Panel found that government "purchases [of] goods" will arise under 
the terms of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement when a "government" or "public body" 
obtains possession (including in the form of an entitlement) over a good by making a payment of 
some kind (monetary or otherwise). In particular, given the specific characteristics of electricity, 
the Panel preferred to characterize a purchase of electricity as involving the transfer of an 
entitlement to electricity, rather than the taking of physical possession of the electricity. Moreover, 
the Panel rejected the European Union's argument that the notion of government "purchases [of] 
goods" implies that the government is the entity being supplied with something for its use. 
The Panel then observed that government "purchases [of] goods" require the involvement of the 
"government" or a "public body". In the Panel's view, this is exactly what happens through the FIT 
Programme and Contracts, where the combined actions of all three "public bodies" involved (i.e. 
the OPA, Hydro One Inc., and the IESO) demonstrate that the Government of Ontario purchases 
electricity within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement. 
Third, the Panel found that the legislative and regulatory framework of the FIT Programme and 
Contracts supports the conclusion that the challenged measures are perceived by the Government 
of Ontario and by others in Ontario as governmental activity that involves the procurement or 
purchase of electricity.’ (emphasis in the original) 
The AB upheld these findings (§5.128). 
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Benefit: this is where the crux of the analysis by both the Panel and the AB took place. The Panel 
(§§7.243ff.) had found that the measure could not have been equated to a subsidy because, on the 
evidence provided, the Panel could not establish whether a benefit had indeed been bestowed. The 
Panel held that it did not possess enough information to decide whether this had been the case: for a 
finding that a benefit had been bestowed, a comparison between the rate of return provided to the 
generators benefiting from the FIT and the average cost of capital for business of comparable risk 
profile was warranted;
13
 as the Panel did not possess information on this score, it could not decide this 
issue. In §7.322, we read:  
‘Thus, one way to determine whether the challenged measures confer a benefit within the meaning 
of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement would involve testing them against the types of arm's 
length purchase transactions that would exist in a wholesale electricity market whose broad 
parameters are defined by the Government of Ontario. In the present set of circumstances, this 
could be done by comparing the terms and conditions of the challenged FIT and microFIT 
Contracts with the terms and conditions that would be offered by commercial distributors of 
electricity acting under a government-imposed obligation to acquire electricity from generators 
operating solar PV and wind power plants of a comparable scale to those functioning under the 
FIT Programme.’ 
One member of the Panel issued a dissenting opinion, holding that a benefit had indeed been 
conferred, since on Canada’s own admission producers of solar energy would not be in the market in 
the first place absent the Canadian measure (§§9.11ff.).  
The AB was thus confronted with a majority opinion that left the matter un-decided (in the absence 
of adequate evidence), and a minority opinion to the effect that a benefit had indeed been bestowed.
14
  
The AB first defined the relevant product market, a necessary pre-condition in its view in order to 
decide whether a benefit had been bestowed to specific recipients. It held that two separate markets 
existed, namely, a market for conventional-, and a market for renewable energy (§§5.176ff.); in doing 
that, it distanced itself from the Panel, since, in its view, supply side- substitutability mattered for the 
definition of the relevant product market (§§5.171-172). That is, as well as considering the 
substitutability of conventional and renewable energy from the perspective of consumers of that 
energy (i.e., demand-side analysis, where the AB agreed that there is a high degree of substitutability 
(§5.170)), the AB argued that it also mattered how substitutable the two goods were from the 
producer’s perspective. In making this argument the AB cited as precedent EC and Certain Member 
States – Large Civil Aircraft where, in addressing market definition for the purposes of Articles 
6(3)(a) and 6(3)(b) of the SCM Agreement, the AB had found: 
‘Demand-side substitutability – that is, when two products are considered substitutable by 
consumers – is an indispensable, but not the only relevant, criterion to consider when assessing 
whether two products are in a single market. Rather, a consideration of substitutability on the 
supply-side may also be required. For example, evidence on whether a supplier can switch its 
production at limited or prohibitive cost from one product to another in a short period of time may 
also inform the question of whether two products are in a single market.’
15
 
                                                     
13
 They did not say that this was necessary; rather they said that this was one way in which a proper benchmark could have 
been established. They did not rule out, however, the use of other methods (other than those that had been offered by the 
complainants, all of which they rejected), see Panel report at §7.322. It is worth noting that putting such a test into 
practice would be challenging to say the least; how to identify a sector with a “comparable risk profile,” and how to 
accurately estimate the cost of capital facing this sector? 
14
 The member expressing the minority opinion did not explicitly ask the question whether the subsidy was specific as well. 
Since local content subsidies are prohibited, and since all prohibited subsidies are specific, this question need not be 
asked anyway, though.  
15
 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (EC and 
Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft), WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 18 May 2011, para 1121. Cited at §5.171. 
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The AB found that in the present case there were supply-side factors that argued in favour of 
considering renewable energy as a different market from conventionally produced energy. 
Specifically, renewable energy producers cannot compete with conventional producers; this is a result 
of their different cost structures and operating costs (very high upfront capital costs, very low 
operating costs) and characteristics (intermittency of supply means such power is unsuitable for base-
load and peak-load generation). (§5.174) 
These considerations mean that, where there is straight competition between conventional and 
renewable energy producers, “markets for wind- and solar PV-generated electricity can only come into 
existence as a matter of government regulation.” (§5.175) Whether that regulation comes in the form 
of a FIT or in the form of a mandated obligation for utilities to purchase some quantity of electricity 
from renewable sources, this amounts to a regulatory creation of a new market, through a 
determination of the supply mix. Importantly, at this point the AB warns that, for either type of 
measure, “the definition of a certain supply-mix by the government cannot in and of itself be 
considered as conferring a benefit within the meaning of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.” (Ibid; 
emphasis in the original). 
As this warning presages, the resulting finding—that the relevant market for the purposes of 
determining a benefit is not the competitive wholesale market, but rather the competitive markets for 
wind- and solar PV-generated electricity—is the cornerstone of the AB’s disagreement with the Panel, 
and lies at the heart of the AB’s inability to find that the measure at hand is a subsidy.  
With the market now defined, the next logical question was whether a benefit had been bestowed 
on producers of renewable energy. Two paragraphs of the AB report are important in this context. 
First, §5.185: 
‘Nevertheless, while introducing legitimate policy considerations into the determination of benefit 
cannot be reconciled with Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, we do not think that a market-
based approach to benefit benchmarks excludes taking into account situations where governments 
intervene to create markets that would otherwise not exist. For example, governments create 
electricity markets with constant and reliable supply. By regulating the quantity and the type of 
electricity that is supplied through the network (base-load, intermediate-load, or peak-load) and the 
timing of such supply, governments ensure that there is a continuous supply-demand balance 
between generators and consumers, thus avoiding imbalances that would destabilize the network 
and cause interruptions of power supply. Although this type of intervention has an effect on 
market prices, as opposed to a situation where prices are determined by unconstrained forces of 
supply and demand, it does not exclude per se treating the resulting prices as market prices for the 
purposes of a benefit analysis under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. In fact, in the absence 
of such government intervention, there could not be a market with a constant and reliable supply 
of electricity.’   
Then, §5.188: 
‘Nevertheless, a distinction should be drawn between, on the one hand, government interventions 
that create markets that would otherwise not exist and, on the other hand, other types of 
government interventions in support of certain players in markets that already exist, or to correct 
market distortions therein. Where a government creates a market, it cannot be said that the 
government intervention distorts the market, as there would not be a market if the government had 
not created it. While the creation of markets by a government does not in and of itself give rise to 
subsidies within the meaning of the SCM Agreement, government intervention in existing markets 
may amount to subsidies when they take the form of a financial contribution, or income or price 
support, and confer a benefit to specific enterprises or industries.’ (emphasis in the original) 
So, in the eyes of the AB, the examination whether a subsidy has been bestowed is different when the 
financial contribution is made to an established market, as opposed to cases when a ‘new’ market is 
created, and it seems fair to conclude that a demonstration that a subsidy has been bestowed will be 
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much harder in the latter case.
16
 As noted above, the Canadian Province of Ontario was ‘establishing’ 
a new market through regulation, as opposed to intervening in an existing market, and this meant that 
the appropriate benchmark for determining a benefit was to be found in a competitive market for 
renewable energy that has characteristics sufficiently similar to those faced by Ontario. This 
immediately implies that if such a market can be found, the benchmark price will be higher than that 
found in the market for conventional power (given the fact, noted above, that renewable energy 
producers are uncompetitive vis-à-vis conventional energy producers). It also implies that the search 
for such a market will be difficult – certainly more complex than finding a benchmark price in the 
existing Ontario wholesale market, for example. This may again favour the case of support to a new 
market over the case of support to players in existing markets. In the present case this difficulty was 
the proximate reason for the AB’s inability to complete the analysis and determine whether a benefit 
had been conferred; the AB cited the, “complexity of the issues and … the absence of full exploration 
of the issues before the Panel.” (§5.244) 
Specificity: recall that for a scheme to be considered a ‘subsidy’ in the SCM Agreement sense of 
the term, three requirements must be cumulatively met, namely, a financial contribution by a 
government, which confers a benefit to a specific recipient. As detailed above, in this case, the AB 
could not find that a benefit had been bestowed. Hence, it did not need to examine whether the scheme 
satisfied the specificity-requirement (Art. 2 SCM Agreement) since, even if this were the case, it 
would still not qualify as subsidy: ‘two out of three ain’t good enough’.  
Conclusion: in Canada-Renewable Energy, the Panel and the AB (§6.1) concurred that the 
Canadian measure was a trade-related investment measure that conditioned some advantage on a local 
content-requirement, and thus was in violation of Art. III.4 GATT. The AB, upholding the outcome 
but not the approach of the Panel, further held that it was unable to determine that the Canadian 
scheme was a prohibited subsidy (§5.246). 
III. A Critique 
III.A. Local Content, Global Mess 
The complaint regarding local content was formulated as follows by the Panel (§7.108): ‘The 
complainants argue that the measures at issue are TRIMs because they (i) encourage investment in the 
local production of renewable energy generation equipment and components in Ontario; and (ii) affect 
trade in wind and solar energy generation equipment by favouring Ontario products over imported 
products.’ 
Premium rates for electricity should be paid to ‘qualifying generators’ assuming local content 
(between 25 and 60% depending on whether it was solar or wind energy being produced) had been 
satisfied (§§7.150ff. of the Panel report).  
Following the advent of the SCM Agreement, local content requirements are sanctioned by both 
the GATT as well as the SCM Agreement. There is a twist though: under the SCM Agreement, 
disputes concerning local content requirements will be adjudicated within short deadlines, and, in case 
the complainant has been successful, the challenged scheme must be withdrawn ‘without delay’ (Art. 
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 The AB held in §5.190 that the relevant benchmark price would be established by finding some market with the same 
characteristics in which Ontario found itself (given the supply mix of energy products, for example, e.g. the mix between 
renewable and non-renewable energy). In the (unlikely) event that we could find a perfect market of that sort, there is still 
the possibility that Ontario’s FIT program would still qualify as subsidy, if it involved compensation well above the rates 
found in that comparator market. Thus the AB was careful on to say that in and of itself, the mandated supply mix (which 
creates the new market) did not create a subsidy. But it did not totally exclude the possibility for a government to create a 
new market and be subsidizing.  
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4 SCM Agreement). This is not the case with respect to local content requirements falling under the 
aegis of the GATT. 
The Panel and the AB found that the challenged scheme involved local content requirements, but 
could not determine whether they were linked to a subsidy. It is, of course, possible for local content 
requirements to stand quite apart from any subsidy; this is the case, for example, when local content 
requirements are of exclusively regulatory nature, e.g. ‘in Home, car makers can only use domestic 
steel for the production of cars’. Can it also be the case when governments provide financial 
contributions? In other words: should we understand that the TRIMs- and the SCM Agreement are 
complements, or partial substitutes in this respect? 
The Panel used the Illustrative List established in the Annex to the TRIMs Agreement as source of 
inspiration for its findings. The first two items that are relevant for the present case are reproduced 
here:  
‘1. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in 
paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under 
domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an 
advantage, and which require: 
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any 
domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or 
value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production; or 
(b) that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount 
related to the volume or value of local products that it exports.’  
These are ‘regulatory’ requirements. There is no financial contribution by the government involved 
here. This was not the case though, with the subsidies provided by the Canadian Province of Ontario, 
where a fixed price would be paid to qualifying generators: the requirement to use local content full 
stop, and payment of money if local content has been used are two different measures; in the former 
case, no one can use ‘foreign’ content, whereas in the latter producers who might find it profitable to 
do so, will go ahead and do so even though they might be foregoing a financial contribution by the 
government.  
It is true that the chapeau to the two examples mentions that complying with the requirements is 
necessary to obtain an ‘advantage’ without any further qualification. It could be argued that 
‘advantage’ could be both fiscal, or non-fiscal. In principle, thus, it could be that the term ‘advantage’ 
in the context of local content requirements could be some financial contribution. Or could it? We 
believe that this could never have been the intention of the drafters: financial contributions would 
come under Art. III.8 GATT (in the GATT-world) and the SCM Agreement (in the WTO-era). 
The Indicative List included in the TRIMs Agreement provides support for our claim. In principle, 
many other TRIMs could come under the aegis of the Agreement. Indicative lists serve two purposes: 
on the one hand, to help the judge avoid type II errors (since, when encountering facts similar to those 
appearing in the list, the judge will know that the rule of law applies); on the other, it informs the 
judge (as well as the WTO Members) about the ‘class’ of measures that the legislator intended to 
subsume under the legal discipline had it opted for a ‘complete’ contract.17 By restricting the 
Illustrative List to examples of ‘regulatory’ nature, the legislator evidenced its will to subsume only 
local content requirements of ‘regulatory’ nature. Local content requirements that involve financial 
contribution by the government should come under the aegis of the SCM Agreement.
18
  
                                                     
17
 Horn et al. (2010) explain why contracts like the WTO are almost obligationally incomplete, be it for reasons of 
diminishing returns or political realism.  
18
 This is probably why local content requirements are prohibited subsidies, e.g. there is favourable burden of persuasion 
that falls on the shoulders of complainants, since there is no need to show specificity, as per Art. 2.3 SCM Agreement 
which we discuss below.  
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In fact, the Panel and the AB divided the challenged measure in two: a requirement to use domestic 
generators, and a payment of money as if the two were unrelated. They found against the former, and 
decided that the latter did not qualify as subsidy for the reasons advanced above. So what if Canada 
now turns, drops the local content requirement, and continues to provide financial contributions to 
producers of electricity? Would this measure pass the test of consistency with the WTO? The likelier 
response is no, and we will return to it in what follows below.  
III.B. Supply Substitutability: Handle with Care 
As noted above, the AB allows for supply side factors to help define the relevant market to be used in 
the construction of a benchmark. It tries to paint this as in line with previous practice, but the argument 
is unconvincing. As noted above, it cites a paragraph from the AB report in EC and Certain Member 
States – Large Civil Aircraft (para 1121) that is taken out of context. That report cites only one 
example of a supply side factor that might be necessary to consider: whether a supplier might be able 
to easily switch its production from one product to another, presumably referring to switching from a 
subsidized product to a substitute product. This may be relevant to determining serious prejudice, 
which was in fact the context for the EC and Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft discussion. 
That is, for the purposes of determining serious prejudice it is relevant that Boeing might, absent the 
subsidies, be able to enter markets held by Airbus. But the fact is that Boeing is not currently in those 
markets. So this tells us nothing about whether the goods that Boeing is currently producing are part of 
the same market as the subsidized Airbus aircrafts, whether they are competitive substitutes. In other 
words, it tells us nothing about whether a benefit has been conferred relative to a benchmark case. The 
point is that while supply-side factors in this case may be relevant to determining injury, they are 
irrelevant to determining the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of establishing a 
benchmark. 
The wider implications of the AB’s reasoning are significant. If country A sells widgets, and 
country B’s producers come up with a new substitute for widgets that is uncompetitive because of cost 
structures and other supply-side factors, this ruling seems to give legal flexibility for country B to 
subsidize its uncompetitive producers. No benefit will be assessed because country B’s producers are 
not in the same market as country A’s producers, even though the two goods are substitutes. The cost 
structure of production, and other uncompetitive supply-side characteristics of the new good, which 
are the underlying drivers of the need for subsidy, mean that country B’s producers are in a different 
market for the purposes of establishing a benchmark market price.  
This seems to grant surprisingly generous leeway to states engaging in industrial policy, in a 
manner that seems inconsistent with the intent of the drafters of WTO law. Art. XVIII(c) GATT is an 
exception for infant industry, but it is limited for use by developing countries only. The AB, through 
its ruling, seems to have opened the door wide to infant industry protection. If this were the intention 
of the drafters, they would not have restricted it to Art. XVIII(c) GATT; they would have made it 
possible for the whole Membership to profit from similar possibilities. 
Granted, the AB later in its deliberations cautions that there’s a difference between support to 
create a new market and supporting players in an existing market, with prejudice to the latter (§5.188), 
indicating that they hope the door will not be completely open. We examine this aspect of the ruling in 
the next section. 
III.C. New and Old Markets: does it Matter? 
Having defined the relevant market for determination of benefit as the market in which electricity 
from renewable sources is traded, the AB then turns to determining the benchmark price that should be 
used. In theory (though not in practice), this should be fairly straightforward: since the existing market 
for renewables in Ontario cannot be used, it should be a matter of finding some Canadian comparator 
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market in which the prevailing market conditions were similar to those in Ontario’s market for 
renewable energy – some other jurisdiction that was similarly engaged in actively changing the supply 
mix to increase the penetration of wind and solar power. If this cannot be found in Canada then, as per 
US Softwood Lumber IV,
19
 it can be sought outside the country, or a constructed benchmark can be 
created that is calibrated to account for the prevailing market conditions in Ontario. 
But rather than focus on the task at hand, the AB goes back to, in effect, again justify its decision 
to use the market for renewables as the relevant market. It argues at some length that the “prevailing 
market conditions” for the purpose of determining a benchmark include the mandate for increased 
renewables in the supply mix (§§5.183 – 187). But the hazard here is obvious. If a government 
purchases goods or services at a premium rate in order to achieve some objective – for example 
economic development—shall we take that objective into account when determining the benchmark 
price, by finding the prevailing purchase prices in another jurisdiction that has similar objectives for 
firms in that sector? Lest a precedent be set that allows the intent of any government regulation to 
affect the benchmark price, the AB creates what is, in effect, a new distinction, between measures that 
create a new market, and measures that support active players in existing markets. 
‘Nevertheless, a distinction should be drawn between, on the one hand, government interventions 
that create markets that would otherwise not exist and, on the other hand, other types of 
government interventions in support of certain players in markets that already exist, or to correct 
market distortions therein. Where a government creates a market, it cannot be said that the 
government intervention distorts the market, as there would not be a market if the government had 
not created it. While the creation of markets by a government does not in and of itself give rise to 
subsidies within the meaning of the SCM Agreement, government interventions in existing 
markets may amount to subsidies when they take the form of a financial contribution, or income or 
price support, and confer a benefit to specific enterprises or industries.’ (§5.188) 
This distinction is closely related to the supply-side analysis discussed above. At the basis of the 
analysis is the underlying government objective – a certain energy supply mix (we will come back 
later to consider the significance of this treatment of the government’s objectives). Given that 
objective, and the supply-side factors at play—including cost structures and problems of 
intermittency—the government was compelled to enact measures that in effect created a new market.  
‘… even if demand-side factors weigh in favour of defining the relevant market as a single market 
for electricity generated from all sources of energy, supply-side factors suggest that important 
differences in cost structures and operating costs and characteristics among generating 
technologies prevent the very existence of wind power and solar PV generation, absent 
government definition of the energy supply-mix of electricity generation technologies. This, in 
turn, [should] have led the Panel to conclude that the benefit comparison under Article 1.1(b) 
should not be conducted within the competitive wholesale electricity market as a whole, but within 
competitive markets for wind- and solar PV-generated electricity, which are created by the 
government definition of the energy supply-mix.’ (para 5.178, emphasis added) 
There are some problems with this approach. For one thing, the distinction between government 
intervention that creates new markets, and intervention in an established market has no statutory 
underpinning. Arts. 1 and 2 SCM Agreement do not contain any language to this effect. As well, and 
partly as a result of the novelty of the approach, there is no clear guidance on how we might 
distinguish between new markets and existing ones. It can be difficult to properly delineate a market 
ab initio: the multimedia market is a proper illustration, where industrial equipment that belonged to 
different markets has merged into one market. If government support was critical to the underlying 
technological evolution, could the newness of the market shelter that support from subsidies 
disciplines, in the way the AB argues it should for Ontario’s renewables support? In the end the 
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 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain 
Softwood Lumber from Canada (US _ Softwood Lumber IV), WT/DS257/AB/R, circulated 19 January 2004. 
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new/existing markets distinction may slightly narrow the scope for industrial policy to avoid subsidies 
disciplines, but the extent and nature of that narrowing are entirely unclear. 
III.D. A Victory for Green Measures? 
While the AB’s ruling might seem welcome news from an environmental perspective – after all, the 
“green” part of this measure was not found to be a subsidy – policy makers should not rely on the 
expectation that the legal acrobatics performed in this case will be repeated. FITs have not been 
offered a safe haven. 
The AB will inevitably have to narrow down its judgment in the future, and no one at this stage can 
predict by how much. Recall, we held that the distinction between ‘establishing’ new markets and 
providing subsidies in ‘existing’ markets was tenuous for two reasons: first, it is difficult to decide 
what a new market is; how many wind producers would need to be established in a market for it to be 
considered an existing market? Is the determinant of newness the degree of market penetration (and if 
so, at the national or international levels, and to what degree?), or is it the costs of production – the so-
called supply-side factors that the AB held were responsible for their determination that the relevant 
comparator market was the market for renewables? If the latter, how low do the costs need to fall 
before we can consider the market to be existing, rather than new?  
Second, even if the new/existing market distinction is maintained, and the relevant market is held 
to be the market for renewables, recall that the AB in this case has described the sort of information it 
might need to establish whether a benefit has in fact been conferred. Future complainants can be 
expected to take guidance from this decision by providing suggested benchmark markets that 
approximate the conditions found in the implementing jurisdiction. Future panels will have a much 
harder time blaming a lack of data for the inability to determine a benefit. And when the comparator 
market is established, of course it will be possible for a FIT to confer a benefit if the remuneration in 
the implementing jurisdiction is higher than that in the comparator jurisdiction. Relatively generous 
FIT schemes would likely be found to be subsidies. 
Finally, it simply cannot be that in the name of this artificial distinction the door to industrial policy 
unlimited has been opened. The AB, even assuming it insists on this distinction in the future as well, 
will need to impose some limits so as to avoid abuses in the name of establishing new markets. 
Even the ‘cleanest’ of green measures would find no safe harbour in facing the SCM Agreement as 
currently formulated. Imagine a payment to consumers—rather than producers—to compensate them 
for consumption of higher priced renewable electricity. The SCM Agreement in Art. 1 does not 
request that the recipient be a producer; Art. 2 SCM Agreement however, dealing with ‘specificity’ 
requests that payments be made to an enterprise or group of enterprises, making it thus prima facie 
impossible for WTO Members to successfully challenge subsidies paid to final consumers of goods. 
Or is it the case? The ‘pass through’ jurisprudence has established that plaintiffs can successfully 
challenge schemes paid to entities other than the direct beneficiary. Assuming for example, that a 
subsidy to consumers switches demand from non-renewable to renewable energy without affecting the 
overall volume of consumption, and without privileging a particular producer (say national over 
foreign), then it will be hard to see how a challenge against similar schemes can ever succeed before 
the WTO. Conversely, as a result of the scheme it could be that consumers privilege consumption of 
domestic renewable energy—for example because no foreign producers are supplying power to this 
market— and in this case, an indirect benefit has been conferred to a particular enterprise or group of 
enterprises. Only an analysis of the facts can help establish what has actually happened, and 
distinguish wheat from chaff. The good news is that, contrary to the standard of review employed in 
Art. III GATT cases, the SCM Agreement requests an effects-test. The bad news is that on occasion 
judges might find some effects favouring domestic producers (as a result for example of legal import 
tariffs on energy) and sanction even the ‘purest’ of green measures. 
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In short, those aspiring to adopt similar ‘green’ and ‘blue’, or simply ‘green’ measures should not 
be overjoyed because of the findings of the AB in this particular case. 
IV. The AB’s Dilemma 
The AB in this case ventured far from familiar ground in some important respects. It invented a new 
and significant distinction between new and established markets, it resorted to supply-side factors to 
determine the relevant market, in the process collapsing injury-analysis with market definition. All of 
this seems to be driven by a reluctance to find that a FIT is in fact a subsidy. 
IV.A. It’s So Hard to Find a Good FIT 
What is it about the FIT that might have inspired such legal acrobatics on the part of the AB? It is 
suggested above that the FITs used by Ontario (but not necessarily the conditions attached in the form 
of LCRs) are designed to foster a global public good: mitigation of climate change. Three things are 
worth noting about this objective. First, this is a significant good. Climate change has been called the 
“greatest market failure the world has ever seen,” capable, if unaddressed, of shaving off 5% (and as 
much as 20%) of the world’s GDP “each year, now and forever.”20 Almost all of the world’s nations 
have explicit international legal obligations to address the problem. 
21
 
The second point is that addressing climate change creates global public goods. There is an 
important distinction between trade-related measures designed to achieve such benefits and those 
designed to achieve benefits that vest purely at the domestic level. In the latter case, the economic pain 
of disrupted trade and investment, felt primarily by other countries, is balanced off against benefits felt 
primarily in the implementing country. In the former case, the costs are the same but the benefits are 
felt by all – including those suffering the costs of trade and investment disruption. The distinction is 
material in determining the fundamental propriety of any measure, a task we cannot avoid if we 
contemplate reform of existing laws.  
The third point is that there is nothing protectionist inherent in this measure. A FIT in and of itself, 
minus the LCR conditions, can and does benefit investors and traded goods from any provenance 
without discrimination. 
Do the measures in question actually address climate change? Certainly we can say that the FIT 
does, aimed as it is at rapid and extensive deployment of renewable energy generation capacity. 
Energy related carbon emissions make up a full 70% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
22
 
Further, a number of studies have shown that FITS do indeed foster a rapid deployment of capacity for 
renewably generated electricity.
23
 
It would be more difficult to evaluate whether the LCR attached to the FIT in this case also 
addresses climate change. Its proximate objectives and impacts are entirely rooted in national benefits 
such as job creation and fostering national firms that can compete at the global level in the renewable 
energy space. And its immediate cost impacts work against climate change mitigation, since they 
inevitably increase the cost of installed capacity by forcing investors to source from more costly local 
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 Stern (2006). The most recent studies by Stern (2013) and Pindyck (2013) point to the fact that if at all, the size of the 
problem has been under-estimated.  
21
 Those obligations are found in the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
done at New York, 9 May 1992, 31 ILM 849), Art. 4, and the Kyoto Protocol (Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, (Kyoto 
Protocol), adopted 11 December 1997, 47 ILM 22), Art. 3. Both developed and developing countries have obligations, 
albeit of different character, and they exist in both the Convention and the Protocol. 
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 IEA (2012). 
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 Lipp (2007); Butler and Neuhoff (2008); Fouquet and Johansson (2008); Deutsche Bank (2010).  
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suppliers. The only conceivable way in which such a measure could be considered to work toward 
mitigation of climate change would be to pass a modified version of the “Bastable test”. As interpreted 
by Kent (1960), the Bastable test says that an industrial policy measure is worthwhile if the total costs 
of support are outweighed by the present discounted value of the benefits derived. A Bastable test that 
asked about industrial policy’s global environmental impacts, rather than its national economic 
impacts, would count as costs the lost environmental benefits from slower deployment of those 
technologies. Against this, it would balance off the future environmental benefits of the policy. These 
might include, if the industrial policy is successful, the environmental impacts resulting from the 
creation of new innovators and competitors in the environmental technology space. Like the original 
Bastable test, this modified test is more heuristic than practical; it would be challenging to apply, but it 
highlights the important considerations at play. And it points to an important truth: if green industrial 
policy is a failure from the economic perspective, it is necessarily also a failure from the 
environmental perspective. 
We do not believe that the AB did not consider these issues, even if there is no reflection and 
explicit mention in the report. In the final analysis, we have one measure (the FIT) that makes an 
undeniable positive contribution to a global public good – mitigating climate change, and is not 
protectionist in character. The other measure is harder to assess, and is fundamentally protectionist. 
The convoluted reasoning of the AB and the Panel are, in our view, motivated by a desire to find the 
LCR in breach of WTO obligations, but to avoid finding the FIT itself to be a subsidy. The former 
result was guaranteed in any case by the finding that the LCR was a prohibited performance 
requirement under TRIMs. As to the latter, the acrobatics involved in both the Panel and AB reports 
are testimony to the challenge this entailed under existing law. 
What we are suggesting is that the underlying rationale for the FIT was an important consideration 
in how the measure was treated in the Panel and AB decisions. The AB, however, protests that such is 
not the case: 
‘We understand [the] statements by the Panel to suggest that a benchmark for wind- and solar PV-
generated electricity in Ontario should take into account the government's definition of the energy 
supply-mix as including wind power and solar PV generation. However, we do not consider that 
these statements should be interpreted as suggesting that the policy objectives underlying 
electricity production and supply entirely prevent a market-based approach to the determination of 
benefit. To do so would mean to read an exception into Article 1.1(b) based on the rationale of the 
subsidy that has no textual basis in the Agreement.’ (§5.182, emphasis added).  
And: 
 ‘… while introducing legitimate policy considerations into the determination of benefit cannot be 
reconciled with Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, we do not think that a market-based 
approach to benefit benchmarks excludes taking into account situations where governments 
intervene to create markets that would otherwise not exist.’ (§5.185, emphasis added) 
Rather, the AB argues that its treatment of Ontario’s FIT regime is grounded in the newness of the 
market, and the supply factors that characterize the renewable energy markets – arguments that we 
have shown above to be fundamentally incomplete. At the same time, the AB in several places takes 
pains to explain—even defend—the underlying environmental rationale for the government 
intervention in the electricity market: 
‘Governments intervene by reducing reliance on fossil energy resources and promoting the 
generation of electricity from renewable energy resources to ensure the sustainability of electricity 
markets in the long term. Fossil energy resources are exhaustible, and thus fossil energy needs to 
be replaced progressively if electricity supply is to be guaranteed in the long term. Government 
intervention in favour of the substitution of fossil energy with renewable energy today is meant to 
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ensure the proper functioning or the existence of an electricity market with a constant and reliable 
supply of electricity in the long term.’ (§5.186)
24
 
And: 
‘We further note that a comparison between renewable energy electricity generators and 
conventional energy electricity generators requires consideration of the full costs associated with 
the generation of electricity. In this respect, if, on the one hand, higher prices for renewable 
electricity have certain positive externalities, such as guaranteeing long-term supply and 
addressing environmental concerns, on the other hand, lower prices for non-renewable electricity 
generation have certain negative externalities, such as the adverse impact on human health and the 
environment of fossil fuel energy emissions and nuclear waste disposal. Considerations related to 
these externalities will often underlie a government definition of the energy supply-mix and thus 
be the reason why governments intervene to create markets for renewable electricity generation.’ 
(§5.189) 
While such statements may be read as arguing the legitimacy and importance of the policy objectives 
that gave rise to the measures in question, the AB is careful not to cross the line to arguing that these 
worthy rationales should be the basis for special treatment under WTO law. But these statements fit 
well into a pattern of reasoning that seems to seek to protect FITs from a finding of subsidy – a worthy 
objective for all the reasons summarized above, but one that would be frustrated by the law as it exists. 
IV.B. The Turquoise Mess 
The local content requirement attached to the FIT in this case presented relatively few legal difficulties 
compared to those presented by the FIT itself. As noted above, the Panel found that the local content 
requirement constituted an investment measure that was inconsistent with GATT Art. III(4), as per 
TRIMS Agreement Art. 2(1).
25
 This finding was not appealed. Had the FIT been found to be a 
subsidy, the conditioning of that subsidy on the local content requirement would have certainly meant 
that it was a prohibited subsidy, as per SCM Agreement Art. 3.1(b). 
Unlike the FIT, which has an environmental rationale, the LCR attached to it has an industrial 
policy rationale. That is, the aim of the LCR is to create jobs, and to help foster infant industries in the 
covered sector(s). This inherently economic rationale is also at the heart of the trade regime’s 
discomfort with it as a tool. It is designed to divert investment and trade so as to benefit domestic 
firms at the expense of their foreign competitors.  
Does attaching the LCR to an environmentally motivated measure such as the FIT change the 
picture at all? Does the blue measure (the LCR) actually help achieve the objectives of the green 
measure? If it did, and if we took the rationale of the measure into account, the LCR attached to an 
environmental subsidy might merit special treatment.  
One way in which the LCR might help achieve environmental gains is as argued in the previous 
section: it might successfully propel an infant industry into a mature innovating competitor in a space 
that urgently needs more innovation and competition. As noted above, though, any such environmental 
gains would have to be balanced against the short term environmental costs of forcing environmental 
goods to come at higher prices (the environmental Bastable test). 
Another way an LCR might help achieve environmental goals is by making environmental measure 
politically feasible. That is, for example, it may have been politically impossible to sell Ontario 
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consumers the idea of higher costs of electricity just for environmental reasons, even if price hikes 
were justified on social welfare grounds. It is much easier for a politician to convince the electorate to 
go along with environmental measures if they can be said to also bring economic benefit. This is the 
political attractiveness of the so-called green economy paradigm.
26
  
It is difficult to see the political feasibility rationale justifying an exception to trade rules. This is 
not so much a slippery slope as a sudden cliff. Protectionist measures are inherently politically 
popular, so it would be unwise to open a door for measures on the grounds that they were a necessary 
evil to enable the passage of some good policy. 
Somewhat more plausible is an exception based on the grounds that the measure passed the 
environmental Bastable test. But even this would be difficult. Obviously assessing the environmental 
benefits and costs would be challenging, but there are more fundamental problems. The GATT Article 
XX exceptions, while arguably not applicable to subsidies, reflect the prevailing notion that we need 
to separate legitimate environmental measures from those that are disguised protectionism, as if all 
environmental measures can be cleanly divided into one or the other camp. The job of Article XX’s 
chapeau is among other things to perform this division. Green industrial policy measures, however, 
necessarily occupy both camps at once. When green and blue measures mix to become turquoise, 
things get messy.
27
 
V. What Could the AB Have Done? 
Before we go any further, we should re-iterate that, by virtue of Art. 3.2 DSU (Dispute Settlement 
Understanding), the WTO Agreement administering dispute adjudication, Panels and the AB cannot 
undo the balance of rights and obligations that the WTO Members have struck: they cannot add to the 
obligations agreed, as they cannot diminish the acknowledged rights.  
The SCM Agreement distinguishes between actionable and prohibited subsidies. A third category, 
the so-called non-actionable subsidies, ceased to exist in 2000, and we will return to this issue below. 
As discussed above, the AB was unable to find that a benefit had been bestowed through the FIT 
Programme and the MicroFit Contracts in Canada-Renewable Energy. We explained why this 
approach was tenuous to say the least, and why we cannot expect to see it repeated in future decisions. 
Was there a better way that the AB could have used to avoid finding the FIT in breach of WTO 
obligations?  
V.A. Is an Art. XX GATT Defence Possible? 
The FIT has characteristics that would have made it liable to be saved by Article XX GATT, were the 
measure in question a restriction on trade in goods, as opposed to a support measure cum subsidy. 
Case law has not addressed the issue whether Art. XX GATT can serve as exception to violations of 
the SCM Agreement. The law itself is silent on this issue. 
Rubini (2012) has argued that, in case there is no agreement to reinstate non-actionable subsidies in 
the SCM Agreement, Art. XX GATT could be an acceptable second-best since it would allow for 
subsidies ostensibly justified on environmental grounds to become de facto non-actionable. Howse 
(2010) has expressed similar views arguing that understanding Art. XX GATT as exception to 
violations of SCM Agreement is probably necessary since the SCM Agreement itself does not 
distinguish between subsidies that distort, and subsidies that address distortions. Lester (2011) 
advances arguments in favour of constructing the SCM Agreement as a means of fighting against 
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‘protectionist’ subsidies only, that is, subsidies void of a public policy rationale other than to increase 
the income of producers.
28
  
At the heart of similar claims lies the frustration of trade experts with the absence of recognition in 
the SCM Agreement context of the reason for subsidization. Subsidies might be a very appropriate 
instrument to deal with market distortions and, as the saying goes, ‘markets work well when it comes 
to ice cream, but not necessarily so when it comes to clean air’. Is however, this argument legally 
sustainable? 
There is, of course, partial overlap between the list of Art. XX GATT, and the list in Art. 8 SCM 
Agreement: ‘green’ subsidies could come under Art. XX(b) and XX(g) GATT anyway. The 
negotiating record strongly indicates that the idea was to examine ‘green’ subsidies in a self-contained 
manner in the SCM Agreement context: documents by the Secretariat,
29
 the Chairman of the 
Negotiating Group on Trade Environment,
30
 as well as by various WTO Members belonging to 
different alliances, such as New Zealand,
31
 India,
32
 and Austria on behalf of EFTA (European Free 
Trade Association),
33
 strongly support the conclusion that Art. 8 SCM Agreement was not thought of 
as an add-on to Art. XX GATT, but rather as the only provision dealing with subsidies not bound by 
the disciplines embedded in the SCM Agreement.  
Moreover, an affirmative response to the question (is Art. XX GATT an exception to the SCM 
Agreement?) would almost axiomatically fail the test of consistency with the chapeau of Art. XX 
GATT which calls for absence of discrimination across countries where similar situations prevail: it 
cannot have been the intent of WTO Members to allow discriminatory payment of subsidies only to 
national firms through Art. III.8(b) GATT, only to reverse that allowance through the back door (Art. 
XX GATT). 
V.B. A Specificity Defence 
Art. 2.3 SCM Agreement reads: ‘Any subsidy falling under the provisions of Article 3 shall be deemed 
to be specific.’ 
How does this play out in Canada-Renewable Energy? There is financial contribution to producers 
(in principle, an un-identified number of private parties as well) of renewable energy. If there was no 
local content-requirement, then maybe the scheme would have been hailed non-specific. We say 
maybe, because the limits of de facto specificity are quite fuzzy in case law: subsidies which have not 
been limited to few enterprises, or which have been provided in accordance with objective criteria, can 
still be specific. To decide if this has indeed been the case, an investigating authority must review 
whether the scheme is (Art. 2.1(c) SCM Agreement): 
(a) Used by a limited number of enterprises; 
(b) Predominant used by certain enterprises; 
(c) Disproportionately large amounts to certain enterprises; 
(d) Manner in which discretion has been exercised to grant a subsidy. 
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There is no obligation to examine all four factors, as the Panel on US—Softwood Lumber IV made 
clear:
34
 in this case, Canada had argued that the Canadian government had never intentionally limited 
access to the stumpage programmes; in its view, the predominant use of the stumpage programmes by 
lumber producers could be explained by the fact that the alleged financial contribution consisted of the 
provision of trees, which, thanks to inherent characteristics, are of interest mainly to a limited number 
of log and lumber producers. The Panel was of the view that there was no need to show intent in order 
to satisfy the de facto specificity requirement, although deliberate action by the government might be 
revealing; what matters is that one (at least) of the four criteria mentioned in Art. 2.1(c) SCM 
Agreement had been met: in this case, stumpage programmes could only benefit lumber producers 
(§7.116). 
In the case we discuss though, there was a local content requirement, so the Panel (and the AB) 
took the view that they were facing a discreet choice: either the scheme was a prohibited subsidy, or 
no subsidy at all. In other words, they treated the presumption established in Art. 2.3 SCM Agreement 
as irrebuttable. 
So far there has been no case where, in presence of a finding that a subsidy is prohibited, WTO 
adjudicating bodies also examined to what extent it was specific. It seems thus, that the Panel and the 
AB would be breaking new grounds had they decided to ask whether the subsidy were specific.  
Moreover, had they done so, one might legitimately ask what the difference between prohibited and 
actionable subsidies after all is? In both cases, a financial contribution must bestow a benefit to 
specific recipients; in case of non-implementation, following US-Upland Cotton (Art. 22.6-US), 
countermeasures against recalcitrant WTO Members will be calculated using the same formula. It 
follows that the only substantive difference between the two has to do with the presumptive specificity 
as far as prohibited subsidies are concerned. If this becomes a rebuttable presumption, then differences 
have vanished. This cannot be. 
These are thus, strong arguments for constructing Art. 2.3 SCM Agreement as a provision that 
establishes irrebutable presumption. 
V.C. Public Goods 
There is nothing like a public goods-defence in the SCM Agreement either. Prima facie, one would be 
tempted to suggest that any of the ‘specificity’-provision (Art. 2 SCM Agreement), the benefits test, or 
Art. 8 SCM Agreement were supposed to play this role. Since the latter provision has been rescinded, 
the question arises to what extent the former suffices as is to play this role. 
A negative response is warranted: governments might have to provide monetary incentives to a few 
enterprises (specific contributions) in order for the society at large to enjoy say clean air; they do not 
have to provide monetary incentives to the whole society (non-specific) to achieve this goal. Actually, 
this was the rationale behind Art. 8 SCM Agreement in the first place: it was meant to allow specific 
subsidies stay in place without the risk of facing countermeasures. 
Is a benefit though, being provided to operators when they receive money in order to produce a 
public good? Or, better, was ‘benefit’ inserted in the SCM Agreement in order to capture situations 
where a public good is being conferred?
 35
 It can be argued that payment to firms that create public 
goods is simply payment of the full benefits conferred by the firm’s actions – an internalization of 
external environmental costs.  
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It is widely acknowledged that governments have a duty to address environmental problems within 
their territories, and a number of international legal agreements commit states to also addressing 
global environmental issues such as climate change. Customary international law, as summarized in 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, affirms that “States have … the responsibility 
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”36 Under the UNFCCC, Parties agree 
that they shall, inter alia “formulate [and] implement … programmes containing measures to mitigate 
climate change.”37 One of the most important routes for such action is via tax and regulatory policy 
that internalizes environmental costs, but the scale of the climate change problem dictates that this will 
not be enough; in some sectors we will also need government support for early stage 
commercialization of mitigation technologies — policy designed to have governments pay the 
necessary price for achieving broad social benefits.
38
 
If we imagined a scenario in which a government’s financial contributions were somehow exactly 
matched to the unpaid social benefits that would be derived from the investment that they support, 
then the question would be whether this could be correctly construed as a benefit to the receiving firm. 
Certainly there is the possibility that such payments would put the firm in an advantaged competitive 
position relative to its unsupported competitors. But in such a case it would be the unsupported 
competitors, and not the receiving firm, that faced inaccurate market price signals, raising the question 
of what is the appropriate market against which to benchmark. 
Clearly it would be difficult to determine whether a given subsidy exactly matched the social 
benefits it created.
39
 It is not suggested here that such a calculation be made in cases such as the one at 
hand. But it is suggested that the conventional approach is inadequate when dealing with government 
support that aims to internalize external benefits. 
So within the existing law, could the AB have used this sort of reasoning to find that the FIT was 
not in fact a subsidy? The absence of a distinction across subsidies using the rationale (or legislative 
intent) as criterion, leads us to respond in the negative here as well. 
40
 
V.D. Non-Actionable Subsidies 
V.D.1. Is the Provision on Non-Actionable Subsidies Legally Relevant?  
Three types of subsidies were considered non-actionable: regional aid, environmental subsidies, and 
subsidies for research and development (R&D) purposes, provided they did not exceed agreed 
quantitative thresholds. They were initially contracted for a five-year provisional period. In the 
absence of agreement to keep this category in place, non-actionable subsidies ceased to exist as of 1 
January 2000 (Art. 31 SCM Agreement). Consequently, a scheme which qualifies as a subsidy under 
the SCM Agreement is, nowadays, either a prohibited or an actionable subsidy.
41
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Should deletion be equated to legal irrelevance? Art. 6.1 SCM Agreement has been rescinded by 
virtue of the same provision (Art. 31 SCM Agreement), and yet Panels continuously use it as legal 
context. Art. 6.1 SCM Agreement provides the complainant with an important evidentiary advantage, 
since it is relieved of the burden to demonstrate the prejudicial effects of a subsidy. The Panel on 
US—Upland Cotton took the view that it could still provide useful guidance in interpreting serious 
prejudice (footnote 1487 of the report), even if the evidentiary advantage has ceased. The Panel on 
Korea—Commercial Vessels evidences a similar attitude (§7.583).  
The legal relevance of this provision though is largely due to the fact that, while Art. 6.1 SCM 
Agreement has been rescinded, the concept of ‘serious prejudice’ has not. It is very much alive. 
Conversely, as we briefly discuss in what follows, the concept of non-actionable subsidies has been 
taken out from the WTO arsenal of rights and obligations.  
V.D.2. The Origin of Art. 8 SCM Agreement in the Tokyo Round  
The distinction between ‘prohibited’, ‘actionable’, and ‘non-actionable’ subsidies has been 
colloquially known as the ‘traffic light’ approach. The ‘traffic light’ approach was first proposed by 
the US during the Tokyo round. The US proposal distinguished between ‘prohibited’, ‘conditional’, 
and ‘permitted’ subsidies in the following terms: 
‘New international rules, on subsidies and offsetting measures 'should deal with all three of these 
problems. The objective of these rules would be to categorize all types of subsidy practices and set 
forth the conditions by which offsetting measures could be taken against such practices. In 
particular, rules are needed to: 
1) Effectively delineate that category of subsidies that should be prohibited; 
2) Place limits and constraints on the use of domestic subsidies' that benefit exports to the 
detriment of other nations; 
3) Delineate which subsidy measures should be permitted; 
… 
Permitted. The permitted category would consist of practices that are considered to have minimal 
impact on international trade. Permitted practices would be limited to those specifically agreed as 
falling within that category. Such practices and any practices judged to result in a de minimis 
subsidy, would not be subject to offsetting measures.’
42
 
The US proposal made waves, and was reflected in various official GATT publications: 
‘In 1975 a proposal was tabled that there should be an international code to deal with export 
subsidies, third country subsidization, import-replacing measures, and offsetting measures. The 
code should categorize all types of subsidy practices and set out the conditions on which offsetting 
measures could be taken against such practices. Subsidies should be divided into the following 
three categories: 
- prohibited (practices designed to increase the competitiveness of national producers, thereby 
distorting international trade); 
- conditional (practices directed toward domestic economic, political or social objectives, but which 
may distort international trade); 
- permitted (practices with little or no impact on international trade against which offsetting 
measures could not be taken). Although this proposal was not maintained as a basis for the 
negotiations, elements of it were eventually carried over into the final Agreement.’
43
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The GATT Activities of 1975 even reflect a passage where the term ‘traffic light’ had been privileged, 
although environmental subsidies were not explicitly mentioned: 
 ‘One suggestion would have a new single international code which would classify export 
subsidies into three major categories: prohibited, intermediate, and permitted practices. The 
intermediate category in this "tricolour" or "traffic light" scheme, as it has been dubbed, could 
include incentives such as research and development grants, regional development grants and the 
like.’
44
  
Eventually, the US dropped the proposal. In an effort to facilitate the conclusion of the round, they 
shifted the focus of the negotiation towards the issues that would form the bedrock of the Tokyo round 
agreement. This is how Winham (1986:173) recounts the events: 
‘In a major initiative, the United States agreed in principle to work from existing GATT rules on 
subsidy/countervail, which carried the implication of moving toward an international definition of 
material injury. The United States also dropped the traffic-light approach that rested on the notion 
of defining prohibited categories of subsidies. Negotiation on this basis quickly isolated the 
irreducible minimum for both partners. On the American side, this was the need to demonstrate 
that the Europeans were willing to accept increased international surveillance and discipline on the 
use of subsidies, while on the European side it was simply a matter of having the Americans 
accept a material injury clause in their countervail legislation. These two demands eventually 
formed the basic quid pro quo of the subsidy/countervail negotiation.’ 
V.D.3. Resurface in the Uruguay Round  
It was first the EU that brought back the issue of non-actionable (permitted) subsidies during the 
negotiations of the Uruguay round. The original EU proposal though did not see room for ‘green’ 
subsidies: generally available- (e.g. tax concessions), regional-, structural adjustment-, and indirect 
subsidies (e.g. subsidies to input products) exhausted the realm of permitted subsidies.
45
 Colombia 
followed suit and proposed illustrative lists for each category of subsidies (for permitted subsidies as 
well).
46
 Switzerland followed soon along the same lines.
47
 
The various proposals found their way in the so-called ‘Cartland drafts’ named after Mike 
Cartland, the Ambassador for Hong Kong, China who was chairing the negotiating group on 
Subsidies. Eventually, environmental subsidies found their way there and the (original) idea was that 
non-recurring subsidies would be paid in order to adapt existing facilities to new environmental 
requirements; the idea was that similar subsidies would be required if, as a result of the new 
environmental standards, economic operators would have to incur considerable financial burden.
48
 
The US was originally hostile to the idea of introducing a category of permitted subsidies: the 
Carter administration of the Tokyo round had given way to the Reagan administration which was in 
place when the Uruguay round was launched (and the Bush administration that followed in the same 
wavelength). In 1992 though, the Clinton administration came to office and this event marked a 
sudden and complete shift in the US position: in November/December 1993, we observe an oscillation 
from the Bush Administration’s attempt to remove green light categories to the Clinton 
Administration’s attempt to expand them.49 
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V.D.4. The Compromise  
Art. 8 SCM Agreement reflects the final compromise, where three categories of subsidies 
(environmental subsidies figuring prominently therein) would be ‘tolerated’ assuming a certain ‘cap’ 
(in the form of total financial contribution) would not be violated. Art. 31 SCM Agreement clarified 
that this provision was of temporary nature:  
‘The provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 6 and the provisions of Article 8 and Article 9 shall 
apply for a period of five years, beginning with the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement. Not later than 180 days before the end of this period, the Committee shall review the 
operation of those provisions, with a view to determining whether to extend their application, 
either as presently drafted or in a modified form, for a further period.’ 
V.D.5. Abandoning Art. 8 SCM Agreement  
Art. 8 SCM Agreement expired at the end of 2000. It is clear that there was no consensus to renew it. 
It is unclear why this has been the case. The discussions before the SCM Agreement Committee reveal 
a divide between developed and developing countries: the former were in favour of keeping it in place, 
the latter saw no use in the list of Art. 8 SCM Agreement.
50
  
The minutes of the SCM Agreement Committee reveal a second attempt to save this provision, alas 
to no avail: Switzerland underscored that it would be bad publicity for the WTO to do away with 
‘green’ subsidies; US gave a half-hearted backing to the Swiss proposal; Brazil speaking for most 
developing countries argued that the list would be maintained only if its content would be modified so 
as to suit the interests of developing countries.
51
 No one was prepared to start negotiating the content 
of Art. 8 SCM Agreement anew, and no discussions on this item are reflected in the subsequent 
meetings of the SCM Agreement Committee.
52
 
A different explanation is equally (if not even more) plausible: Stewart (1993) has taken the view 
that there was ab initio a trade-off between Art. 6.1 and 8 SCM Agreement, in the sense that extending 
the life of non-actionable subsidies was always conditional on agreeing on stronger disciplines through 
presumptions of adverse effects for subsidies; since WTO Members could not agree on the latter, they 
would not agree on the former either.
53
  
VI. Options for Reform: We Cannot Rely on Judicial Acrobatics Forever 
We have argued above that we cannot expect an encore performance of the acrobatics performed in 
this case. Moreover, we should not hope for such a thing. Acrobatics lack methodology; if role of 
judge is to complete ‘incomplete’ contracts as per Horn et al. (2010), then methodology is key in 
completion since transactions are idiosyncratic and one can drive a wedge through facts; but the 
manner in which we should think about them is (should be) constant: judges should prepare their own 
demise by making the resolution of the marginal transaction eminently predictable (assuming of 
course no distinguishing factors) 
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VI.A. A Return is not Enough 
If adjudication does not look as the most promising avenue to advance similar concerns, then why not 
simply re-instate Art. 8 SCM Agreement? The discussion before the SCM Agreement Committee 
shows that there was no unanimity to eliminate Art. 8 SCM Agreement: a number of WTO members 
wanted to keep it alive for a few more years and then decide. Presumably, some voices in favour of re-
instating Art. 8 SCM Agreement can still be found in the WTO Membership. And, of course, 
negotiators might have found it easier to re-instate Art. 8 SCM Agreement, rather than negotiate from 
the start a new provision to this effect.  
We believe however, that re-instating this provision is not the solution. First, the statutory caps 
might be an issue. Recall that Art. 8.2 SCM Agreement read:  
‘assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed 
by law and/or regulations which result in greater constraints and financial burden on firms, 
provided that the assistance: 
(i) is a one-time non-recurring measure; and 
(ii) is limited to 20 per cent of the cost of adaptation; and 
(iii) does not cover the cost of replacing and operating the assisted investment, which must be fully 
borne by firms; and 
(iv) is directly linked to and proportionate to a firm's planned reduction of nuisances and pollution, 
and does not cover any manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved; and 
(v) is available to all firms which can adopt the new equipment and/or production processes.’ 
Second, sometimes there is osmosis in the border between environmental protection and public health: 
does it make sense to allow one and not the other, when subsidies, assuming good faith, on both 
occasions would be addressing the under- (or non) supply of a public good? A ‘wider’ exemption is 
warranted; more on this later.  
For all these reasons, we believe that negotiators should rethink the SCM Agreement, and ideally 
de-link its negotiation from the stalling Doha round negotiations. We will try to show in what follows 
that, as a matter of (economic) logic, lumping all subsidies in one basket is simply wrong. Distinctions 
based on the rationale of subsidization must be drawn. It is high time, negotiators return to the table 
and agree that the rationale for subsidies matters to distinguish wheat from chaff, and this is what this 
case underscored: subsidies can distort, as they can address distortions. 
VI.B. Economic Theory and why the Rationale for Subsidies Matters 
From an economic perspective, subsidies are a tool like any other, in some cases suited to purpose and 
in other cases not. There are cases when subsidies are preferable to tariffs; where firms are 
underinvesting or not entering a market because they face high average costs and increasing returns to 
scale, a subsidy may be the first best instrument.
54
 As an instrument of protection subsidies, unlike 
tariffs, do not raise the domestic price of the protected goods above world prices, and therefore have 
potential to be less distortionary.
55
 In practice economists tend to dislike subsidies because they create 
opportunities for rent-seeking and capture of policy making processes by vested interests. But in 
theory, for economists “subsidy” is not a four-letter word. 
Trade law also does not proscribe all subsidies, of course. But as Sykes (2005) argues, the nature of 
the restrictions in trade law does not always correspond to what economic theory would suggest 
appropriate. There is no reason to believe, for example, that specific subsidies are necessarily less 
trade-distorting than general subsidies. As well, subsidy law fails to account for total impact of 
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government actions when determining a benchmark, focusing instead on the single measure at issue. 
And, important to the present analysis,  
‘ … even when an industry is a net beneficiary of government largesse, those benefits may be 
socially justifiable. Some industries may be a source of positive external economies (most likely in 
the high technology area) … Aside from the now expired "green light" subsidy rules, … WTO law 
does nothing to address the question whether the ostensible "subsidy" addresses some legitimate 
problem.’
56
 
There is a vast literature on the economics of subsidies, but the consensus seems to be that they can be 
appropriate tools to use in addressing certain market failures.
57
 If a firm is significantly underinvesting 
in R&D, for example, in the knowledge that some of the benefits of its research will be appropriated 
by others (this effect has been found to be significant in high tech sectors, as Sykes notes above), it 
makes sense to subsidize research and development. Note, however, that the rationale matters to the 
instrument design. If the aim is to overcome underinvestment in R&D it would make little sense to 
provide a subsidy tied to output or exports, since such a subsidy would be available to both the 
innovators and the appropriators, and would likely have no impact on R&D spending levels. Similarly, 
if the market failure to be addressed is the presence of potential cost reductions that can only be 
achieved through learning by doing, and the firm faces imperfect capital markets, then a production-
based subsidy makes sense. It is imperative for the effective use of subsidies that the instrument be 
tailored to address the specific market failure being addressed.
58
 
Those market failures can be of many different types. Under-investment in R&D and learning by 
doing were mentioned above. Another important type of market failure is the divergence of market 
prices and social costs. Consider a producer of electricity from wind, for example, selling power into 
the grid at the same rates as conventional producers. The price paid to the conventional producers 
typically does not factor in the environmental damage done by their production, and the price paid to 
the wind power producer would not factor in the social benefits of avoided environmental damage. As 
such, from society’s perspective the free market solution would see a sub-optimal level of wind power 
production. Subsidies such as FITs can remedy this by working to equate the social benefits derived 
from wind power to the private returns going to the producer. 
The rationale, however, is critical. It dictates not only which instruments are fit to purpose but, as well, 
which instruments we might want to legally proscribe. We may well be able to justify subsidies 
addressing market failure for a wind producer, but that is a very different matter than trying to justify 
subsidies that do not address any market failure, and that transfer public wealth to private interests in 
an effort to protect them from foreign competition. We may in fact hold some objectives so important 
that we can find multilateral tolerance for trade and investment disruption in their service. Of course 
we have already done so in the context of trade in goods; this is the essence of the General Exceptions 
embedded in Art. XX GATT. 
59
 
The measure at issue in Canada – Renewable Energy makes the case powerfully. The FIT, minus 
the LCR, is aimed at an objective that all nations agree is critically important, and that most have legal 
obligations to address. It is not protectionist in intent or effect. Its objective is to rectify a significant 
market failure – the failure to correctly price the environmental costs and benefits of electricity in the 
Ontario wholesale market. The FIT plus the LCR might conceivably be similarly justified from an 
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industrial policy perspective if it can be shown that it is addressing market failure, but as argued above 
this would be difficult.  
And so, we conclude, that rationale should play a role in determining how subsidies are treated 
under WTO law, but there is no scope within the existing SCM Agreement for such differential 
treatment. As such, a redrafting must be contemplated. The question then is how to build such 
treatment into trade and investment law without at the same time inviting misuse of the exception. It is 
to this question that the next section turns. 
VI.C. A New Expanded Art. 8 SCM Agreement 
We have argued that trade law needs to deal with subsidies in a more nuanced manner, distinguishing 
between those that have public goods rationales and those that merely transfer income from taxpayers 
to protect domestic firms. The present case highlights that need. The dangerous legal acrobatics that 
seem to have been necessary to protect the FIT from being found a subsidy are in themselves a 
particularly strong argument for reforming the status quo. 
This sort of rationale-based treatment is already in force in the context of trade in goods. But we 
noted our skepticism that Art. XX GATT could be successfully imported to apply to the SCM 
Agreement, as welcome a development as that might be. We also noted the inapplicability of the 
exceptions included in Art. 8 SCM Agreement – the rationale-based category of non-actionable 
subsidies. 
In any case, the Art. 8 SCM Agreement type formulation seems too narrow in scope to address the 
needs highlighted here. It offers shelter to a very limited number of support measures based on type 
and characteristics. In the context of environmental subsidies, it covers only one-time non-recurring 
payments for a small percentage of the costs of adaptation to new environmental regulations. If this 
exception were in force today, it would be of no use in saving the Ontario FIT or any other measure 
aimed at achieving global public goods through subsidies.
60
 The Art. XX GATT approach, by contrast, 
is much broader. It sets out those objectives that the Parties hold to be important enough to justify 
breaches of such important principles as non-discrimination, and then tries to ensure safeguards that 
will weed out any measures that are not legitimately aimed at such ends. This approach seems to us to 
be closer to what is needed. 
That said, we appreciate the sensitivity of the proposition that some subsidies should enjoy 
essentially non-actionable status under the SCM Agreement. Subsidies to domestic firms can not only 
act to nullify and impair liberalization commitments by shutting out foreign competitors, but can also 
damage foreign competitors’ access to third country markets. Any carve-outs would have to be 
carefully circumscribed. Art. 8 SCM Agreement contains restrictions that were formulated in the spirit 
of this cautious approach.
61
  
In that vein, a hybrid approach that incorporated elements of Art. XX GATT and Art. 8 SCM 
Agreement might be most appropriate for a rationale-based set of exceptions. We might start with an 
Art. XX GATT-like set of acceptable objectives, and then add some prescriptive restrictions based on 
what we know about subsidies. We know, for example, that subsidies that address market failures 
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should be focused on the specific market failure in question. Too many subsidies are blunt, in the 
sense that their impact goes far beyond what is necessary to address the problem in question. We also 
know that it is wise to build explicit provisions for the sunset of subsidies, lest they become 
entrenched and politically impossible to remove even after they no longer serve the need they first set 
out to address. 
As to the acceptable types of subsidies to be covered under such provisions, we see the value of 
offering shelter to subsidies that pursue global public goods – goods that have benefits beyond the 
border of the implementing country. These would include subsidies that internalize externalities with 
respect to climate change (as do FITs, and free allowances under cap and trade schemes), or that 
advance research and development in clean technologies. This could be covered by outlining the 
objective broadly (i.e., protection of global environmental resources), in a way that allows for 
measures devoted to more than just climate change, including biodiversity preservation, reduction of 
ocean pollution and prevention of desertification, for example.  
We also see value in providing exceptions for basic research and development, and for public 
health subsidies. The potential spillover benefits from this type of activity make it similar to the 
pursuit of global environmental protection in our minds. While we see these sorts of rationales as 
important enough to merit exception on their own terms, it is worth noting that limiting exceptions to 
measures with spillover benefits goes some way to compensating for the potential harm they might 
inflict on other Parties. 
There may also be value in providing exceptions for subsidies determined to be minimally trade 
distorting. There was strong agreement for including such subsidies in the non-actionable category of 
subsidies in the negotiations for SCM Agreement’s Article 8.62 Such exceptions fall outside of our 
thrust in this paper, being based on factors other than rationale. And it may be that the requirement to 
show adverse effects (in the case of actionable subsidies) already provides for this kind of protection. 
The question arises whether any such exception would need the equivalent of the chapeau to GATT 
Art. XX – a filter to weed out those measures that are in fact aimed at economic ends rather than those 
specified in the text. In the context of trade in goods this provision has proved its usefulness. This, 
however, is where the turquoise mess becomes evident. A straight FIT would easily pass such a filter, 
but a FIT with local content requirements would not, as LCR is a tool of industrial policy. It was noted 
above, though, that the LCR in the present case might be argued to have environmental ends, if it 
passed the environmental Bastable test by creating more environmental benefits than costs. But it 
would be challenging to give expression of such nuance in legal terms, just as it would to actually 
estimate the costs and benefits in economic terms. 
VII. Concluding Remarks  
In this paper, we have argued in favour of redrafting the SCM Agreement so as to account for the 
rationale of subsidies, and avoid punishing subsidies aiming for example, at promoting a public good. 
We did not rush into this conclusion: we checked case law as it has evolved through the landmark 
Canada-Renewable Energy, and concluded that for good reasons this should be understood as a ‘one 
off’ judgment, that cannot be relied upon in order to save from legal challenges measures aiming to 
correct environmental distortions in the future as well. Worse, it is not clear at all whether measures 
aiming to subsidize production of renewable energy can pass muster even if they were void of local 
content requirements. 
We understand of course that at this juncture, with the Doha round about to be derailed for good or 
saved at a very minor scale, the last thing negotiators would want is to add a new negotiating item to 
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their agenda. And yet, reforming the trade regime so as to be in position to effectively respond to 
global challenges like climate change would be a strong signal that the world community can still 
speak with one voice when necessary. It would further reinforce the role of the WTO at a moment 
when its continued relevance is being strongly undermined as a result of the myriad of preferential 
trade agreements that see the light of the day, and the trade initiatives that conspicuously find new 
homes far from Geneva.  
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